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Executive Summary
Offshore Financial Centers play a
key role in the international financial
system, improving the availability of
credit and encouraging competition in
domestic banking systems. The result
is a boost in investment in the major
economies, which ultimately supports
job creation and growth.
International financial centers (IFCs)
are countries and territories with low
tax rates and other features that make
them attractive investment locations.
These properties of IFCs occasionally
raise concerns that they may erode tax
collections, divert economic activity,
and otherwise burden nearby high-tax
countries. A large body of economic
research over the last 15 years
considers these issues, with findings
that point sharply in the opposite
direction: the evidence strongly
suggests that the policies of IFCs
contribute to investment, employment,
and the efficient functioning of
markets and government policies in
other countries.
IFCs contribute to economic activity
by improving the potential profitability
of business operations elsewhere.
As a result, for a typical American
firm, a 1 percent greater likelihood
of establishing an IFC affiliate is
associated with a 0.5-0.7 percent
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greater sales and investment growth
in the same region in countries other
than IFCs. Furthermore, foreign
investment stimulated by IFCs also
appears to encourage greater domestic
investment: the American evidence
is that 10 percent greater foreign
capital investment triggers 2.6 percent
additional domestic capital investment,
and that 10 percent greater foreign

Offshore Financial
Centers play a
key role in the
international
financial system

employment is associated with 3.7
percent greater domestic employment.
Evidence of the behavior of European,
Canadian, Australian and other firms
offers similar conclusions: expanded
foreign economic opportunities are
associated with greater domestic
investment and employment.
Other evidence indicates that the
financial services offered in IFCs
contribute to the competitiveness of
financial markets in the regions in
which they are located. Commercial
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banks in countries with nearby IFCs
have lower interest rate spreads than
do other countries, and their banking
sectors are less concentrated, as
reflected in lower market shares
for the five largest banks. By every
measure credit is more freely
available in countries proximate to
IFCs, reflecting the degree of banking
competition and the resulting stability
of their financial architectures.
IFC economies have grown very rapidly
in the period since 1980, with average
per capita annual growth rates of
3.3 percent, compared to 1.4 percent for
the world as a whole. This fast pace of
economic growth reflects the benefits
of attracting high levels of foreign
investment and indirectly contributes to
economic prosperity elsewhere through
the usual process by which affluence
spreads across countries. Among
the notable features of IFCs are not
only their high average incomes and
small populations (many are islands),
but also, according to new research
findings, their very high scores on
governance quality measures. Recent
evidence implies that improving the
quality of governance from the level
of Brazil to that of Portugal raises the
likelihood of a small country being an
IFC from 26 percent to roughly
61 percent. This association of IFCs
with governance quality carries
implications for their own and
other countries through the widelyobserved process by which governance
influences economic outcomes, and in
particular, by which bad governance
retards economic performance.

4

Economic outcomes aside, are the tax
policies of other countries somehow
undermined by those of IFCs? IFCs
are typical of small countries in
imposing low income tax rates and
instead relying on expenditure-type
taxes. Contrary to popular impression,
IFCs are not the locations of choice for
anonymous accounts and other vehicles
for international tax evasion, recent
evidence instead indicating that large
countries such as the United States
and the United Kingdom instead serve
this function. Modern tax competition
theories indicate that the low tax
rates available in IFCs contribute to a
form of tax competition that is likely
to contribute to the efficiency of tax
policies elsewhere, by distinguishing
between highly mobile international
investments that are very responsive to
tax rate differences, and less mobile,
more commonly domestic, investments
that large countries are able to tax at
high rates. By fostering this type of
competition, and by not taxing income
that is therefore available for others to
tax, IFCs very likely enhance the ability
of other countries to operate their tax
systems efficiently.

STEP Report 2009

Introduction
The modern world celebrates the
diversity of human experience in
almost all its manifestations – with
the notable exception of national
economic policies, where the absence
of conformity among countries is often
thought to be a source of concern.

International
financial centers
are countries and
territories with tax
and regulatory
policies that
are particularly
favorable to foreign
investment
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One very important policy area in which
countries differ sharply is taxation:
cumulative personal, corporate and
expenditure tax rates range from zero
in some cases to well above 50 percent
in others. Notably, these tax differences
persist among countries that are
geographically very close, implying that
even proximity and the possible ease
of travel and information flow between
low tax and high tax jurisdictions do
not prevent some governments from
imposing much higher taxes than
their neighbors. Tax policies reflect
the choices that governments make
in response to differing national
circumstances, and are typically
enacted independently, without explicit
international cooperation. The absence
of global economic policy coordination
raises pointed questions of whether
and to what extent countries might be
harmed or helped by the tax and other
policies of neighbors that differ greatly
from their own.
Some of the most visible economic
policy differences appear in the

treatment of foreign investment.
International financial centers
(hereinafter, IFCs) are countries and
territories with tax and regulatory
policies that are particularly favorable
to foreign investment. IFCs typically
tax inbound investment at low rates
and encourage business formation
with favorable telecommunications
and transportation facilities, other
business infrastructure, and limited
bureaucratic hurdles to starting new
businesses. In contrast, other nearby
countries may subject investors to
high rates of taxation and various
burdensome legal and regulatory
requirements. IFCs usually differ
in several other significant respects
from their high tax neighbors. IFCs
generally have small populations:
many are islands, and all but a few
have populations below one million in
2004. IFCs have unusually high per
capita incomes. And, as some very
recent evidence indicates, IFCs have
much higher quality of governance
– as measured for example by
effectiveness of democratic
institutions and the absence of
government corruption – than do
most other countries.
Governments of high tax countries
frequently express concerns over
the impact of IFCs on their own
economies. High on the list of such
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concerns is that the policies of IFCs
could erode the tax bases of high tax
jurisdictions. This can happen in any of
several ways, including that residents
of high tax jurisdictions might earn
capital income through accounts
in IFC financial institutions that the
residents fail to disclose to their home
governments. Another possibility is
that income actually earned in high
tax jurisdictions could be reported for
tax purposes to have been earned in
an IFC. And IFCs may attract capital
investment, employment, research
and development, and other business
activities that generate tax revenue
that is arguably lost to other countries
where these activities might otherwise
have been located.

IFCs contribute
to the economic
performance of the
rest of the world,
particularly the
performance
of hightax
countries such
as G-7 nations

6

Contributing to tax base erosion is by no
means the only charge leveled at IFCs
by governments of high tax countries.
The corporate and banking secrecy that
some IFCs are alleged to foster could
be used to facilitate criminal activities in
other countries, including terrorist and
drug-related activities that virtually all
governments seek to combat. Short of
criminal activities, confidential accounts
in IFCs (and elsewhere) reduce the
transparency of financial accounts that
are often thought to contribute to the
smooth operation of legal and financial
systems around the world. Finally,
differences between the policies of
IFCs and those of other countries may
contribute to the problem, if it is one, of
excessive international tax competition.
These are worrisome complaints,
though their striking common feature
is that they are economic in nature
and therefore in principle amenable

to careful empirical and theoretical
analysis. A large and growing body of
economic research over the past 15
years does just that, and the findings
of this research point to conclusions
very different from those on which the
concerns about IFCs are based.
The new economic understanding is
that IFCs contribute to the economic
performance of the rest of the world,
particularly the performance of hightax countries such as G-7 nations.
On close examination virtually all of
the complaints about IFCs appear
to have little economic merit, with
the evidence instead pointing to the
benefits that IFCs confer on other
countries. Far from eroding the tax
bases of high-tax countries, there
is evidence that IFCs improve the
operation of the tax systems of
high-tax countries, thereby
contributing to their ability to raise tax
revenue. This happens both because the
presence of IFCs allows other countries
to maintain high taxes on domestic
firms and because IFCs impose very low
taxes on local business profits, thereby
leaving extensive after-tax profits to be
taxed by others. IFCs attract high levels
of economic activity, but in the course of
doing so promote, rather than depress,
economic activity elsewhere. While
historically IFCs have been associated
with corporate and bank secrecy, the
most recent evidence is that instead,
large wealthy countries such as the
United States and the United Kingdom
are the locations of choice for those
interested in establishing anonymous
accounts. Furthermore, there is strong
evidence that the presence of a nearby
thriving IFC financial sector increases
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the level of competition and the
efficiency of a country’s banking sector.
And the latest tax competition theories
imply that the ability of taxpayers to
use IFCs to avoid certain kinds of taxes
ultimately make tax systems more
efficient by changing the nature of tax
rate competition.
This research is in places complex
and involved, and drawing the right
conclusions from the available evidence
can entail distinguishing between
modeling assumptions, data sources
and statistical methods that to the
untrained eye may point in different
directions. Wading through this material
can be a dreary business, which makes
it understandable that many interested
observers instead proceed on the
basis of informed intuition together
with snippets of anecdotal evidence.
Unfortunately, such a method carries
with it the potential to draw exactly the
wrong conclusions, in part because
careful data interpretation and certain
aspects of economic reasoning can be
so counterintuitive at first exposure.

Greater economic
activity in one
part of the world
need not reduce
activity elsewhere

7

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate
the impact of IFCs on other economies
using insights and evidence from the
latest economic research. As noted,
such an evaluation invariably paints IFCs
in a favorable hue, as the picture that
emerges from this research is one in
which other economies benefit from the
policies of IFCs.
It is fair to ask how it is possible that, in a
high-tax world, divergent states like IFCs
somehow contribute to the economic
well-being of other countries. After
all, the concerns of high-tax countries

seem entirely reasonable, and tax rate
differences alone are commonly thought
to contribute to economic distortions.
Most of the answers lie ultimately in the
policies of high tax countries. Countries
can face difficult political and other
constraints in designing their taxes and
regulations, and the policies ultimately
chosen entail tradeoffs to which they
take differing approaches. Some of
the problems that countries face in
designing their policies, and the costs
that are associated with their choices,
can be mitigated by the actions of IFCs.
In a more perfect world, with universally
efficient and effective tax and regulatory
policies, the benefits that IFCs provide
would be much smaller than they are
today – but that world is today only
a distant possibility. In the world as
we know it, the flaws in national tax
systems and the inefficiencies created
by policy choices can be at least partially
undone, albeit indirectly, by the actions
of IFCs.
In evaluating the contributions of IFCs
it is important to avoid the intuitive,
but ultimately misguided, zero-sum
conception of how economies work.
The reality is that greater economic
activity in one part of the world need not
reduce activity elsewhere. The modern
economic conception is not that there
is a fixed amount of investment and
employment that is distributed among
places in a zero-sum fashion, so that
more for one means less for another.
Instead, it is now understood that
investment, employment and innovation
in one place generally contributes to
related activities elsewhere, and that
this process operates for IFCs as well
as other jurisdictions.
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Why Do Countries
Become IFCs?
IFCs play increasingly important
roles in global financial markets
and the world economy. In order to
evaluate the economic consequences
of IFC policies it is useful to start
with an understanding of the
economic forces that contribute to
the formation of IFCs.

A good part of
the problem facing
governments
is the mobility
and potential
mobility of
economic activity
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The relative ease of international
trade, capital movement and
communication makes it possible for
production to locate in many places
around the world and for tax burdens
to be avoided through international
transactions. Since location choices,
activity levels, and taxable incomes are
sensitive to local tax rates, it stands to
reason that governments would feel
intensifying international pressure
to reduce tax burdens on business
activities, investors, and possibly
high-net-worth individuals. If tax
rates fall without other compensating
changes, then government tax
revenues will decline, and with
them government expenditures. A
general reduction in government
expenditures entails reduced outlays
on social welfare and education
programs, particularly since there
are no countervailing international

pressures on governments to
maintain this spending.
How then can governments find
revenues to finance social spending
and other programs without creating
enormous economic distortions?
Distortions are minimized by taxing
sources of revenue that are least
responsive to taxation. Land is the
classic example of a factor inelastic in
supply and therefore nondistortionary
to tax, though taxing land raises
other issues and in any case modern
governments require far more revenue
than is feasible to obtain from land
taxes alone.
A good part of the problem facing
governments is the mobility and
potential mobility of economic
activity. Some aspects of this mobility
are clearly observable, taking the
form of foreign direct investment
by multinational firms, portfolio
investment by individuals and
financial institutions, international
trade, immigration of individuals,
international licensing of intangible
property, and other forms of
international factor mobility. Other
features of mobility are more subtle,
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taking the form of businesses that
thrive in locations that heretofore
would not have been suitable for
them, workforces that need not move
because markets come to them, and
ideas that are adopted everywhere.
In the absence of coordinated
government policies, the potential
mobility of economic activity makes it
extremely difficult for governments to
exploit monopoly positions over much
of their tax bases, thereby greatly
contributing to the distortions created
in the course of raising tax revenue.

Small countries
with their
relatively more
open economies
have always
faced greater
international
pressures than
have large
countries

9

Small countries, with their relatively
more open economies, have always
faced greater international pressures
than have large countries did, and
their fiscal systems therefore had to
adapt earlier than large countries
did to the greater mobility that
open markets create. The evidence
indicates that small counties rely
much less than other countries do on
income taxes imposed on individuals
and corporations. IFCs, with their
typically very low tax rates on
individual and corporate income, are
prime examples of this. While small
and more open economies certainly
use income taxes, their governments
rely much less on these taxes than
they do on expenditure-type taxes
such as excise, sales and valueadded taxes, as well as tariffs on
imported goods.
Expenditure-type taxes have risen in
popularity everywhere in the world,
as reflected in the fact that more than
130 countries now impose significant
value-added taxes, and there is

widespread reliance on excise taxes
on gasoline and other commodities.
The popularity of expenditure taxes
is due in part to their administrative
and enforcement features, and in
part to their efficiency properties.
In a globalizing world, expenditures
have relatively clear geographic
associations, reducing the potential
for international tax avoidance and
generally reducing the mobility of the
tax base compared to alternatives,
such as personal income taxes
or source-based business taxes,
including the corporate income tax.
Expenditure taxes do not directly tax
capital returns, but do so indirectly
by taxing all returns when spent
on goods and services, which has
the effect of taxing pure profits on
capital investments while effectively
exempting normal returns to saving.
Modern analysis of the corporate
tax rate implications of international
capital mobility dates to Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971), who demonstrate that
efficient taxation by small countries
that are open to international trade
and investment entails zero taxation
of income earned by investors.
The explanation for their result is
that any positive taxation distorts
the economy more than other tax
alternatives would, without shifting
any of the tax burden away from
domestic residents and onto foreign
investors (Gordon and Hines, 2002).
The reason is that small countries
lack the market power necessary
in order to impose tax burdens on
others: investors demand world rates
of return from their investments,
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and in the absence of such returns
will simply locate their investments
elsewhere. As a result, taxes
imposed by small countries must be
offset by higher pretax investment
returns, which can only arise if local

For small
jurisdictions,
taxing investment
entails reducing
local wages
wages fall in response to higher tax
rates. Hence for small jurisdictions,
taxing investment entails reducing
local wages.
But that is not all. Local wages fall
because the productivity of local
labor is reduced by reductions in
investment levels that accompany
higher tax rates. The capital
that remains earns an adequate
after-tax return, but the outcome
is nonetheless inefficient for the
usual reasons why tax-induced
production distortions are inefficient:
investments that would otherwise add
economic value do not materialize
due to tax distortions. As a result,
small countries that persist in heavily
taxing income earned by foreign
investors will have lower incomes
than those that do not.
Governments unable to raise
significant amounts of revenue by
taxing mobile business income
may be able to use other taxes, but
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the revenue potential of certain
alternatives to business taxes are
to a lesser degree also limited by
international considerations. In
the case of personal income taxes,
the ability to use international
financial transactions may facilitate
tax avoidance by high income
taxpayers, and international
mobility of individuals and their
earnings increases the mobility
of the personal income tax base.
Furthermore, downward pressure
on business tax rates created by
international competition is likely
to exert downward pressure on top
personal income tax rates also, due
to the ability of taxpayers to select the
forms of business organization. Top
personal income tax rates that greatly
exceed top corporate income tax
rates create incentives for individuals
to create corporations financed
with personal investments which
effectively convert personal income
into corporate income, thereby
undermining the revenue potential
of high personal tax rates and in the
process inefficiently directing their
investments (Gordon and MackieMason, 1995). In response to this
possibility, many governments
are loath to introduce significant
distinctions between top personal and
business tax rates.
What this adds up to is a strong
economic prescription for small
countries that have successfully
joined the world economy through
trade and investment. The economies
of these countries benefit from tax
systems that eschew corporate and
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personal income taxes in favor of
expenditure-type taxes such as valueadded taxes. IFCs appear to have
paid heed to this message, and while
they are perhaps the most successful
examples, they are not alone.

The low corporate
and personal tax
rates offered
by IFCs are
consistent with
the positions of
small countries
in the world
economy
Hines and Summers (2009) report
that countries with small populations,
and those that are most open to
international trade, rely much less
heavily on corporate and personal
income taxes than do larger and
more economically closed countries
(such as the United States). The small
countries instead use expendituretype taxes to fund their governments.
In their statistical analysis of the
determinants of tax revenues, Hines
and Summers report that, in 1999, a 10
percent smaller national population is
associated with a 1 percent lower ratio
of income taxes to total tax revenue
– and evidence from changes over
time point to even stronger effects of
changes in country size on the use of
income taxes.
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Far from being anomalous, the low
corporate and personal tax rates
offered by IFCs are consistent with
the positions of small countries in
the world economy. As the process
of globalization deepens, and more
countries come to rely on international
flows of trade and investment, in
some sense all countries become
smaller and more open, and therefore
all countries may find aspects of
IFC economic policies increasingly
attractive for themselves.
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The Economic
Role of IFCs
IFCs play increasingly important roles
in global financial markets and the
world economy. There are at least five
ways in which IFCs contribute to the
operation of economies worldwide.

Firms that are
more likely to
establish finance
affiliates in IFCs
exhibit more rapid
growth rates of
investment and
sales in nearby
high-tax countries

12

The first is the important role of IFCs in
stimulating foreign direct investment in
high-tax parts of the world. Investors
are often better able to structure
their capital commitments to hightax countries by combining their
investments in high-tax places with
investments in IFCs, and it appears that
levels of foreign direct investment in
high-tax countries are sensitive to the
availability of financing structures that
use IFCs. Evidence of foreign direct
investment patterns indicates that
firms that are more likely to establish
finance affiliates in IFCs exhibit more
rapid growth rates of investment and
sales in nearby high-tax countries.
The second contribution of IFCs is
to discipline financial markets in
other parts of the world, limiting the
degree to which banks and other
large institutions can exploit local
monopolies to the disadvantage of
individuals and businesses. The
ability of investors to channel financial

transactions through IFCs reduces
interest rate spreads, arbitrary
credit allocation, and other problems
associated with excessive market
power on the part of local financial
intermediaries. As a result, IFCs
enhance the stability of the world
financial architecture.
The third role of IFCs is to promote
good government and the benefits that
flow from democratic accountability.
The evidence indicates that by far the
most successful international financial
centers are those whose governments
score highly on the World Bank’s
indicators of governance quality.
Furthermore, countries and territories
without good governance institutions
are much less likely to become IFCs
than are otherwise similar countries
and territories that have high quality
governance institutions. As a result,
IFCs display the economic benefits
available from democratic reforms,
hopefully indirectly encouraging such
reforms. Moreover, the unwillingness
of market actors to devote extensive
resources to the few IFCs without high
quality governance institutions means
that the IFC market is dominated
by countries and territories with

STEP Report 2009

institutions established by transparent
and accountable governments.

The large highincome countries
such as the United
States, the United
Kingdom, and
Canada, with their
relaxed banking
requirements,
serve as the easiest
locations for the
establishment
of anonymous
accounts.
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The transparency and accountability of
IFC governance structures may seem
inconsistent with their reputations
as locations of choice for money
launderers, tax evaders, and others
seeking to establish anonymous
accounts in which to hide assets from
others. Quite apart from the distasteful
aspects of assisting in the avoidance
activities of others, a country that
offers ready availability of anonymous
accounts may indirectly contribute to
the worsening of governance structures
around the world by facilitating the
payment of bribes to government
officials and others. The most recent
evidence indicates, however, that IFCs
such as: Bermuda, the British Virgin
Islands, the Bahamas, the Cayman
Islands, and Panama in fact adhere
rather strictly to international norms
requiring ample documentation in order
to create corporate entities and bank
accounts, making them unattractive
locations for money laundering and tax
evasion. Instead, the large high-income
countries such as the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Canada, with
their relaxed banking requirements,
serve as the easiest locations for the
establishment of anonymous accounts.
The fourth role of IFCs is their impact
on tax collections and tax competition
among large countries. The evidence of
the last 30 years is that there has been
precious little tax competition among
OECD countries, as tax bases have
broadened at the same time, and to the
same degree, that tax rates have fallen.

Recent economic research suggests
that the availability of targeted lowtax opportunities, such as financing
structures that use IFCs, permits
governments to maintain healthy
domestic tax bases without triggering,
beggar thy neighbor, tax competition.
Hence far from ushering an era of
unbridled tax competition, there is
good reason to believe that IFCs permit
governments of large countries to
implement the domestic tax policies
they want and need in the face of
international economic pressures.
The fifth role of IFCs is their place in
the world economy. IFCs as a group
have enjoyed rapid economic growth in
the last 25 years, reflecting in part the
growing importance of financial sectors
of modern economies, and in part the
special roles played by IFCs. Greater
affluence in this part of the world
contributes to economic performance
elsewhere, as part of the usual process
of economic spillover. Far from drawing
down or somehow reducing economic
activity elsewhere in the world, the
ability of IFCs to contribute to finance
and other sectors adds value to
economic activity everywhere.
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IFCs and Business
Activity in High
Tax Countries
There is widespread concern that
low-tax jurisdictions, either IFCs or
other countries where investment
is facilitated by IFCs, impose costs
on other countries in attracting
investment, employment, and other
business activity that would otherwise
locate in nearby high-tax areas.
These concerns persist despite the
absence of any reliable estimates of
the magnitude or even the direction of
such diversion.

The availability
of IFCs that
reduce the costs
of using lowtax jurisdictions
facilitates foreign
investment and
economic activity
in nearby high-tax
jurisdictions

14

Recent quantitative evidence (e.g.,
Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006a,b)
implies that, in fact, the opposite
process takes place: that the availability
of IFCs that reduce the costs of using
low-tax jurisdictions facilitates foreign
investment and economic activity
in nearby high-tax jurisdictions.
There are multiple channels through
which IFCs have this effect, all of
them stemming ultimately from
the ability of investors to use IFC
financing structures to rationalize
their finances and their tax situations.
Tax-efficient financing structures in
IFCs permit taxpayers to avoid costly

tax situations in high-tax areas,
thereby increasing rates of return
and making investment in high-tax
places more attractive. For investors
located in countries that tax active
business income earned elsewhere,
the use of IFCs can facilitate deferral
of home-country taxation of foreign
income, which increases returns to
foreign investments. Finally, financial
services and other intermediate goods
and services obtained at low after-tax
cost in IFCs increase the productivity
and competitiveness of economic
operations in high-tax countries,
thereby increasing demand for
production in those locations.
By way of explanation, tax deferral is
the practice of delaying home-country
taxation of foreign income until that
income is returned (“repatriated”)
to the home country. Virtually all
countries permit one form or another
of deferral, most commonly by not
taxing foreign income at all. Among
those countries that tax active foreign
business income, this income is subject
to home country taxes only when
effectively repatriated, which entails
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either its remittance to domestic parent
companies or else its use for purposes
that smack of excessive attempted
avoidance, such as parking the funds in
passive investments in low-tax foreign
countries. In a deferral regime, a
corporation that earns 100 in a foreign
jurisdiction with a 20 percent tax rate
pays 20 to the foreign government, and
has 80 remaining in after-tax profits.
If the firm’s home government taxes
foreign and domestic corporate income
at 35 percent, while granting credits for
foreign tax payments, the firm owes 15
to its home government (35 minus the
foreign tax credit of 20) on its foreign
income, but this home country tax
obligation is deferred as long as the
company retains its profits abroad.

Firms subject to
significant home
country taxation
on accrued foreign
profits would
find themselves
significantly
disadvantaged
in competition
with firms from
other countries

15

The alternative to deferral is to tax
foreign income as it accrues, but
countries are loathe to adopt accrual
taxation of foreign income for fear
of its likely draconian impact on
the competitiveness of their firms
in foreign markets. There is a
solid basis for this concern: firms
subject to significant home country
taxation on accrued foreign profits
would find themselves significantly
disadvantaged in competition with
firms from other countries. Since
the foreign tax credit mechanism
implies that income earned in lowtax countries is subject to the highest
rates of home country taxation,
the likely outcome of a country
adopting accrual taxation is that its
firms would be unable to compete
effectively for investments in lowtax countries. Therefore, in order
to maintain the competitiveness of

domestic firms in foreign markets,
countries universally permit the
deferral of home country taxation of
active foreign business income.
Desai, Foley and Hines (2006b)
offer evidence of the use of IFCs
by American multinational firms.
Large multinationals, and those
that are most active abroad, are the
most likely to have affiliates in IFCs,
suggesting that the benefits offered
by IFCs increase with the scale of
financial operations. Additionally,
it is informative to distinguish
the use of IFCs by multinational
parent companies in different
industries. Firms in those industries
characterized by low foreign tax
rates and high volumes of intrafirm
trade are more likely than others to
have operations in IFCs. In addition,
technology-intensive firms have
higher than average propensities to
establish operations in IFCs.
This evidence is inconsistent with
the common view that multinational
firms use IFCs solely to reallocate
taxable income from high-tax to lowtax jurisdictions through intrafirm
trade and transfers of intangible
property, since if that were the case
then one would expect investors
with IFC operations to be those with
the highest foreign tax rates. Firms
earning income in high-tax locations
have the strongest incentives to
reallocate taxable income to low-tax
locations. Consequently, the fact
that multinationals in industries with
low foreign tax rates are more likely
to operate in tax IFCs indicates that
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IFC affiliates do not merely serve
to relocate profits away from hightax locations. Instead, this piece of
evidence suggests that American
firms with low foreign tax rates benefit
from using IFC operations to facilitate
beneficial financial transactions, some
of which may be intended to defer,
or otherwise reduce, the cost of U.S.
taxation of their foreign incomes.

American
multinational
firms can benefit
from using IFCs
to structure
transactions that
mitigate some of
the costs of the
U.S. system
of taxing the
worldwide incomes
of American
companies
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American multinational firms can
benefit from using IFCs to structure
transactions that mitigate some of
the costs of the U.S. system of taxing
the worldwide incomes of American
companies. American firms owe
taxes to the United States on all of
their worldwide incomes, but in order
to mitigate double taxation they are
entitled to claim credits for taxes paid
to foreign governments. As a result
of this foreign tax credit system,
an American taxpayer owes tax to
the United States on the difference
between the U.S. and foreign rate
(understanding that if the foreign tax
rate exceeds the U.S. rate the U.S.
government does not provide a tax
refund). Thus, if an American taxpayer
earns USD 100 in a foreign jurisdiction
with a 20 per cent tax rate, then with a
35 per cent U.S. tax rate the taxpayer
owes USD 20 (20 per cent of USD 100)
to the foreign government and
USD 35 (35 per cent of USD 100) to
the U.S. government, but the U.S. tax
liability is reduced to USD 15 because
the taxpayer can claim a credit for
USD 20 of tax paid to the foreign
government. Furthermore, the United
States defers taxation of the profits
earned by the foreign subsidiaries

of its resident companies until these
profits are repatriated to the United
States in the form of dividends paid to
parent companies.
As a consequence of the system of
worldwide taxation and foreign tax
credits, profits earned in low-tax
countries typically generate U.S. tax
liabilities when repatriated. Analyses
in Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and
Desai, Foley and Hines (2003) illustrate
the uses of IFCs to facilitate deferral
of repatriation taxes through a variety
of ownership arrangements. These
arrangements must be carefully
structured in order to avoid immediate
home country taxation of certain
passive types of income, but they can
nonetheless offer benefits to investors
with significant potential exposure
to home country taxation of lightly
taxed foreign income. Consequently,
IFCs can benefit multinationals with
profits in high-tax locations that can be
reallocated to low-tax locations, and
can also benefit multinationals with
profits in low-tax locations on which
repatriation taxes can be deferred.
How is it possible to infer the impact
of IFC operations on economic
activities elsewhere? The conceptual
difficulty facing such an exercise is
that taxpayers choose all of their
operations jointly, and on the basis
of many considerations that may not
be apparent to outside observers.
Since IFC operations are themselves
the product of purposeful choice, it
can be very difficult to know that any
observed association between IFC
operations and domestic operations
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actually represents the effects of IFC
operations, since the association might
instead simply reflect the impact of
factors that lead a firm to establish an
IFC in the first place. For example,
since larger firms are more apt than
others to have IFC operations, it is
possible that any apparent association
of IFC operations and domestic
operations might simply indicate what
large firms do, rather than what firms
with IFC operations do. In the case
of firm size, it is possible to correct
for this effect by controlling for firm
size in analyzing the impact of IFC
operations, but this is possible only
because firm size is readily apparent to
outside analysts. Other firm features,
such as different business strategies
and business models, differing market
niches, connections of various sorts
to local industries, personnel policies,
and many others, are far more opaque
to outsiders and therefore in practice
almost impossible to correct for in
analyzing the impact of IFC operations.
Fortunately, there are circumstances
in which this inference problem can be
addressed in a very satisfactory way,
albeit using a method that has a quirky
and indirect look. To start with an
unrealistic scenario, if IFC operations
were randomly assigned to some
multinational firms and not others,
then by comparing the reactions of
firms getting IFC operations with
the reactions of firms not getting
IFC operations (and assuming that
those not assigned IFC operations
were prohibited from setting any new
ones up), it would be possible to infer
what effect IFCs have on economic
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activity elsewhere. For example, if
firms assigned IFC operations then
expanded their employment and
capital investment in nearby high-tax
locations, a valid conclusion would be
that the availability of IFC operations
stimulates economic activity in hightax places. This kind of random
assignment is the sine qua non of
experimental inference, but alas
virtually never happens in practice,
so this possibility, while intriguing, is
primarily illustrative.
A second unrealistic scenario is one in
which business operations in hightax countries are randomly assigned
to firms. Following this random
assignment it would then be possible
to measure the extent to which firms
assigned high levels of operations in
high-tax countries are more likely than
others to react by establishing affiliates
in IFCs. If the empirical pattern has
this feature – if firms with operations in
high-tax countries exhibit particularly
strong demand for IFC operations –
then it would follow that IFC operations
and high-tax operations complement
each other. Indeed, economic theory
indicates that the nature of any such
complementarity is symmetric: that if
random assignment of IFC operations
promotes greater activity in hightax countries, it follows that random
assignment of high-tax operations
promotes the establishment of IFC
operations. This does not solve the
problem of finding cases of random
assignment (they generally do not
exist), but it illustrates that one can
look for any impact of IFCs on the hightax world by examining whether the
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high-tax world has an impact on IFCs.

Policies that reduce
the cost of using
IFC operations
should stimulate
greater economic
activity among
foreign affiliates
outside of IFCs
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While random assignment is out of
the question, there is a statistical
alternative known as “instrumental
variables” estimation that has
some of the same features, and
has the virtue of being possible to
implement in practice. In the context
of multinational firms, Desai, Foley
and Hines (2006b) demonstrate how
one can exploit the fact that foreign
economies grow at different rates,
and that the differences in economic
growth rates are associated with
differing rates of growth of economic
activity by U.S.-owned affiliates.
Thus, for example, if Italy’s economy
grows at 8 percent a year and Spain’s
economy grows at 3 percent a year,
American firms will tend to expand
their operations more rapidly in
Italy than in Spain. Following this
example, some American firms start
out with significant Italian operations
and others with significant Spanish
operations. As long as a firm’s initial
distribution of activity among nonIFC countries (in this case, Italy and
Spain) can be treated as “random”
from a statistical standpoint, then the
subsequent differential growth rates
of their economies can be used to
predict non-IFC investment.
The Desai, Foley and Hines (2006b)
study uses the fact that firms differ
in their initial distributions of foreign
economic activity to predict different
growth rates of subsequent activity,
based on differences in the average
GDP growth rates of the countries in
which their activities were initially

concentrated. These predicted
growth rates then can be matched
to the likelihood of the same firms
creating or eliminating IFC affiliates.
The results indicate that greater
activity outside of IFCs is associated
with greater demand for IFC affiliates.
Higher sales growth rates outside
of IFCs are associated with greater
likelihood of establishing IFC
affiliates. This result is not driven
simply by firms that use nearby
IFC affiliates to market their goods
produced in high-tax locations, since
the evidence similarly indicates that
firms accumulating capital at faster
rates outside of IFCs are the ones
that are most likely to acquire new
operations in IFCs.
Firms whose initial investments
were concentrated in economies
that subsequently grew rapidly are
the most likely to establish new IFC
affiliates. This pattern implies that
policies that reduce the cost of using
IFC operations should stimulate
greater economic activity among
foreign affiliates outside of IFCs. The
statistical evidence implies that, for
the typical American multinational
firm, a 1 percent greater likelihood
of establishing an IFC affiliate is
associated with 0.5 to 0.7 percent
greater sales and investment growth
outside of IFCs within the same region.
Desai, Foley and Hines (2006b) offer
some disaggregated regional evidence
of these effects of IFCs. While IFCs in
the Asia/Pacific region appear not to
have statistically significant effects on
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the performance of nearby non-IFC
operations, the estimated effects of
IFCs in the European and American
regions are similar in magnitude, sign,
and significance levels to that of the
whole sample. Given the much greater
economic importance of Europe and
the Americas for U.S. multinationals,
it is perhaps not surprising that their
patterns so closely resemble those of
the sample as a whole.
A recent study by Blanco and Rogers
(2009) draws similar conclusions
from its analysis of the effects of
foreign direct investment in IFCs
on foreign direct investment in
low-income countries in the same
regions. Using country-level data on
aggregate foreign investment flows
from 1990-2006, this study reports that
investment in developing countries is
positively associated with proximity
to the nearest IFC and to the level of
foreign investment in the nearest IFC.

Investment in
developing
countries is
positively
associated with
proximity to the
nearest IFC and to
the level of foreign
investment in the
nearest IFC.
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Contrary to many policy concerns,
therefore, the ability of investors to
use IFC operations does not appear to
divert activity from other jurisdictions.
The empirical evidence indicates
that firms facing reduced costs of
establishing IFC operations respond
in part by expanding their foreign
activities in nearby high-tax countries.
Hence it appears that careful use of
IFC affiliates permits foreign investors
to avoid financing costs they would
otherwise incur, and some of the
tax burdens imposed by domestic
and foreign authorities, thereby
maintaining foreign investment at
levels exceeding those that would

persist if the use of IFCs were more
difficult or costly.
There is a closely related question
about the impact of foreign direct
investment on economic activity in
home countries. If IFCs encourage
foreign direct investment in even hightax foreign countries, might that not
deplete economic resources that would
otherwise be devoted to producing jobs
and activity at home? Put differently,
how should the government of a capital
exporting country view institutions that
contribute to international investment?
It is a curious fact that both capital
exporting countries and capital
importing countries have at times
expressed concern over the
consequences of international capital
flows. Capital exporting countries
worry that too much of their capital
goes abroad while capital importing
countries fear foreign control of
domestic assets and the possible
macroeconomic instability associated
with rapid changes in foreign
investment levels. The concerns of
capital exporting countries, while
diffuse, often are based on conceptions
of outbound foreign direct investment
as diverting economic activity. Given
such conceptions, the growing overseas
activities of multinational firms have
become a source of perceived economic
insecurity for workers, managers, and
tax collectors.
Viewed dispassionately, it is far
from clear that greater levels of
outbound foreign direct investment
come at the cost of economic activity
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at home. Instead, there are two
possibilities. The first possibility is that
a multinational firm’s total worldwide
production level is approximately
fixed, being determined by resource
limits, capacity constraints, or market
competition. Given that output can be
produced either at home or abroad,
any additional foreign production
then necessarily reduces domestic
production, and foreign investment
comes at the cost of domestic
investment. The second, and far
more likely, possibility is that the
level of total production is not fixed,
but it is instead responsive to profit
opportunities. If this is true, then
increases in foreign investment have
the potential to raise the return to
domestic production, stimulating
demand for domestic activity and
domestic output. Firms might, for
example, find that foreign operations
provide valuable intermediate inputs
at low cost, or that foreign affiliates
serve as ready buyers of tangible
and intangible property produced at
home. In either of these cases the
ability to exploit foreign opportunities
increases total demand for domestic
factors of production.
The operation of international
capital markets requires that the
capital account must be balanced
over time: net outbound foreign
investment equals net inbound
foreign investment in present value.
It does not, however, follow from this
implication of market equilibrium
that greater outbound foreign
direct investment triggers greater
inbound foreign direct investment,
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since the capital account can be
balanced either through foreign direct
investment flows or through portfolio
capital flows. Hence the degree to

Increases in
foreign investment
have the potential
to raise the return
to domestic
production,
stimulating
demand for
domestic
activity and
domestic output.

which greater outbound foreign direct
investment is associated with greater
or lesser domestic investment is
ultimately an empirical question.
There is a flurry of recent evidence
suggesting that greater outbound
foreign direct investment may not
reduce the size of the domestic capital
stock, but instead more likely increases
it. This evidence includes aggregate
time-series evidence of the behavior
of U.S. multinational firms (Desai,
Foley and Hines, 2005), aggregate
evidence for Australia (Faeth, 2006),
industry-level studies of Germany
(Arndt, Buch, and Schnitzer, 2007)
and Canada (Hejazi and Pauly, 2003),
and firm-level evidence for the United
States (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2009),
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the United Kingdom (Simpson, 2008)
and Germany (Kleinert and Toubal,
2007). The difficulty confronting all of
these studies is that foreign investment
is itself a purposive choice, reflecting
economic conditions that very likely
also directly influence the desirability
of domestic investment, making it
difficult to disentangle the pure effect of
greater foreign investment on domestic
economic activity. These studies
approach this problem in different
ways, drawing conclusions that are
accordingly persuasive to differing
degrees, though the accumulation
of this evidence strongly points to
the possibility that greater outbound
investment is associated with greater
domestic investment.

Greater levels of
foreign investment
by American
multinational
firms are associated
with expansions
in domestic
production
activities by the
same firms.
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The most recent evidence from the
United States indicates that greater
levels of foreign investment by
American multinational firms are
associated with expansions in domestic
production activities by the same
firms. Desai, Foley and Hines (2005)
analyze annual evidence for American
firms since the early 1980s, asking
to what extent greater expenditures
abroad by multinational firms are
associated with changes in domestic
investment. The pattern is quite
striking: this evidence indicates that an
additional dollar of foreign investment
is associated with USD 3.5 of greater
domestic investment. While intriguing,
this evidence is far from conclusive,
for reasons familiar from the prior
discussion: since there is not random
assignment of foreign investment, it
follows that drawing causal inferences

is potentially fraught with difficulty. In
particular, this pattern could reflect
the impact of fluctuating economic
conditions that influence domestic and
foreign investment in similar directions.
Detailed firm-level evidence indicates
more strongly that there are significant
causal effects of foreign investment
on domestic activity. Desai, Foley
and Hines (2009) evaluate the extent
to which increased foreign activity by
U.S. manufacturing firms influenced
their domestic activities between
1982 and 2004. This exercise employs
confidential affiliate-level information
on the activities of U.S. manufacturing
firms collected by the U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis. These data permit individual
foreign operations to be matched to
the domestic activities of the same
firms; as a result, it is possible
to measure the extent to which
expansions in foreign business activity
coincide with changes in domestic
activity. The evidence indicates that
there is a strong positive correlation
between the domestic and foreign
activity levels of multinational firms.
Figure 1 illustrates this pattern. The
figure depicts changes between fiveyear intervals in the contemporaneous
foreign and domestic sales of individual
American multinational firms, with
changes measured as a percent of
the average of starting and ending
sales levels, so the measured change
varies between -2 and 2. As is evident
from the figure, there is a positive
association between these changes:
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firms that expand their sales abroad
over a five-year period also expand
their sales at home.
As foreign and domestic operations
are jointly determined, this evidence
is difficult to interpret. For example,
the discovery of a new drug by a
pharmaceutical company may result
in increased activity both abroad
and at home. Alternatively, real
exchange rate movements may make
it more profitable for a U.S. firm to
produce in foreign locations and less
profitable to produce in the United
States, thereby encouraging the firm
to expand its foreign activities and
reduce its domestic activities more or
less simultaneously, even though the
foreign activities and domestic activities
are unrelated. Without random
assignment of foreign operations,
or some other plausibly exogenous
variation in the foreign activities of
firms, evaluating the impact of foreign
operations on domestic economic
activity is highly problematic.
Fortunately, it is possible to use a
version of the instrumental variables
method described earlier to replicate
something akin to a random
assignment of foreign operations,
again by exploiting that the locations of
foreign investments differ significantly
between firms. It is therefore possible
to construct firm-specific foreign GDP
growth measures, which can be used
to generate predicted growth rates of
foreign activity that are then used to
explain changes in domestic activity.
This empirical procedure effectively
compares two U.S. firms, one whose
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foreign investments in 1982 were, for
example, concentrated in Britain, and
another whose foreign investments
were concentrated in France. As the
British economy subsequently grew
more rapidly than the French economy,
the firm with British operations should

Foreign economic
growth rates are
strong predictors
of subsequent
foreign investment
by U.S. firms.

exhibit more rapid growth of foreign
investment than would the firm with
French operations. If the domestic
activities of the U.S. firm with British
operations grow at different rates than
the domestic activities of a similar U.S.
firm with French operations, it may
then be appropriate to interpret the
difference as reflecting that foreign
business expansions stimulate greater
business activity at home.
Foreign economic growth rates are
strong predictors of subsequent foreign
investment by U.S. firms. Foreign
growth rates predict increases in
foreign investment by firms whose
foreign affiliates sell their output
locally, and also by firms whose foreign
affiliates export most of their output.
This second relationship suggests that
foreign economic growth rates do not
capture merely the effects of growing
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local demand, but instead also reflect
changing economic opportunities from
movements in real input costs due to
productivity gains or other changes.
Consequently, the method of using
foreign economic growth rates to
predict foreign activity levels provides
evidence of the likely impact of changes
in foreign activity that arise from a
number of possible sources.
The estimates reported by Desai, Foley
and Hines (2009) imply that 10 percent
greater foreign capital investment
triggers 2.6 percent additional
domestic capital investment, and that
10 percent greater foreign employee
compensation is associated with 3.7
percent greater domestic employee
compensation. There are similar
positive relationships between foreign
and domestic changes in assets, and
numbers of employees.

10 percent greater
foreign capital
investment
triggers 2.6
percent additional
domestic capital
investment
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The example of one large U.S.
manufacturing firm illustrates the
relationships manifest in the largesample evidence. Between 2000 and
2006, Caterpillar Inc. increased its
foreign employment by 49 percent,
to the point that foreign employment
constituted half of its total global
employment. Over this period,
Caterpillar’s U.S. exports, a fraction
of which were sent to its foreign
affiliates, grew by 104 percent, and its
U.S. employment grew by 29 percent.
While it is often a mistake to draw
strong inferences for whole economies
from the experiences
of individual companies, the
Caterpillar example offers an
illustration of significant foreign

expansions that are associated with
greater domestic activity.
There are several channels through
which foreign activities can influence
the scope of domestic operations,
including cases in which foreign
production requires inputs of tangible
or intellectual property produced
in the home country. The same
instrumental variables method
used to identify the effect of foreign
investment on domestic investment
can also be used to identify the effect
of foreign investment on other types
of domestic activity. The estimates
reported in Desai, Foley and Hines
(2009) indicate that greater foreign
activity is associated with higher
exports from U.S. parent companies
to their foreign affiliates and is also
associated with greater domestic
R&D spending. Specifically, 10
percent greater predicted foreign
sales growth is associated with 6.5
percent greater exports to foreign
affiliates and 5 percent higher
domestic R&D expenditures.
The estimated effect of foreign
expansions in encouraging domestic
economic activity persists in
supplemental specifications designed
to address alternative interpretations
of the main results. The use of
weighted foreign economic growth
rates as instruments for changes in
foreign investment has the potential
to produce misleading results if the
foreign investments of firms planning
rapid expansion of domestic investment
are disproportionately attracted to
economies expected to grow rapidly.
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To guard against this possibility, Desai,
Foley and Hines (2009) try using only
the portion of foreign GDP growth that
cannot be predicted on the basis of past
growth to explain foreign investment;
this substitution produces results that
are very similar to the others.

It is clear that the
simple story, in
which the world
has a fixed stock of
investment capital
that can either
go to one place or
another, cannot
quite be right
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In order to avoid the possibility
that unexpected industry-specific
events might produce an apparent
correlation of foreign and domestic
investment growth rates, the
statistical evidence reported by Desai,
Foley and Hines (2009) includes
controls for firm industries. If firms
export to unaffiliated customers, and
invest in the same countries, foreign
economic growth rates might directly
stimulate export-oriented domestic
activity. This can be controlled by
including an additional variable equal
to export-weighted foreign economic
growth, which again does not alter
the results. Finally, there are
circumstances in which real exchange
rate movements that are correlated
with economic growth rates might
independently influence both foreign
and domestic activity, but Desai,
Foley and Hines find that replicating
the analysis with controls for firmspecific changes in foreign exchange
rates yields similar answers. Hence
in all of these variations their
evidence offers no support for the
simple, and common, perception that
foreign investment diverts resources
from domestic investment.
It has been natural to assume that
foreign investment comes at the
expense of domestic investment. New

evidence from analyses of American
multinational firms suggests instead
that greater foreign investment is
associated with higher levels of
domestic investment. This estimated
relationship implies that firms
combine home production with foreign
production to generate final output at
lower cost than would be possible with
production in just one country, making
each stage of the production process
more profitable, and therefore, in a
market economy, more abundant. It is
clear that the simple story, in which the
world has a fixed stock of investment
capital that can either go to one place
or another, cannot quite be right. As
a result, IFCs that facilitate foreign
investment thereby indirectly also
stimulate economic activity in capital
exporting countries.
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Competition and
the Banking Sector
A very important function of IFCs
is to provide competition for, and
thereby discipline, financial markets
elsewhere in the world.

Nearby IFCs
have the potential
to address some
of the problems
associated with
uncompetitive
financial sectors.
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The financial sectors of economies
in much of the world are tightly
controlled by small numbers of firms
and by governments, either through
monopolies that are sanctioned by
regulation or, most commonly, through
state ownership of banks (La Porta et
al., 2002). This is particularly true in
low-income countries and countries
that lack strong democratic institutions,
where government ownership of
the banking sector is the norm, and
where there is pervasive cronyism in
the allocation of credit. The resulting
absence of competition in credit
markets raises interest rates charged
to consumers and businesses, and
encourages credit rationing in which
certain borrowers are effectively unable
to obtain credit at any feasible price.
To make matters worse, absence of
competition in banking appears to
influence the whole financial sector,
which is underdeveloped as a result.

In modern economies there is
a considerable cost associated
with financial underdevelopment,
whatever its underlying cause. As
La Porta et al. (2002) document, the
financial sectors of economies with
uncompetitive banking sectors are less
active than are the financial sectors
of other economies, and countries
with monopolized and therefore
underdeveloped financial sectors
exhibit slow rates of productivity growth
and low per capital incomes.
Nearby IFCs have the potential
to address some of the problems
associated with uncompetitive
financial sectors, in essence by
providing a needed source of
competition for local banks and
other financial intermediaries. The
significance of being nearby is that
geographic proximity matters, in that
investors from wealthy countries
put considerably more capital into
nearby IFCs than those that are far
away (Rose and Spiegel, 2007). While
it may seem counterintuitive that in
today’s globalized financial markets
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it matters that an IFC is close to an
investor’s home, in fact the evidence
indicates that this does matter, perhaps
reflecting that firms in IFCs tailor their
services to the needs of nearby clients.

IFCs contribute
to financial sector
depth in nearby
countries
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There is now considerable quantitative
evidence that competition provided
by nearby IFCs is effective. Rose
and Spiegel (2007) document that
commercial banks in countries with
nearby IFCs have lower interest
rate spreads (differences between
borrowing rates and the rates that
depositors are paid) than do other
countries, which is a reliable indicator
of greater banking competition. Their
estimates indicate that, controlling for
other observable factors, doubling a
country’s distance from the nearest
IFC is associated with 1.63 percent
larger interest rate spreads. Other
variables offer similar evidence of the
impact of IFCs on financial market
competition. The banking sectors of
countries proximate to IFCs are less
concentrated, meaning that the share
of the market controlled by the five
largest banks is smaller, and the total
number of banks divided by GDP is
greater, than is the case for countries
without nearby IFCs. Doubling a
country’s distance from the nearest
IFC is associated with a 6.91 percent
greater share of the country’s banking
sector controlled by the five largest
commercial banks. This and the larger
total number of commercial banks
in countries close to IFCs reflect the
difficulty of monopolizing a domestic
banking sector when investors have
alternatives in nearby IFCs.

The market competition associated
with proximity to IFCs has observable
effects on the financial sectors of
affected countries. Rose and Spiegel
report that, compared to other
countries, the private financial markets
of economies with nearby IFCs extend
more credit to their private sectors,
have greater aggregate quasi-liquid
liabilities (reflective of levels of market
borrowing), and higher levels of M2
(a monetary aggregate that is partly
the product of intermediation by the
banking sector). All of these measures
are consistent with high levels of
private sector financial activity.
It is clear from this evidence that IFCs
contribute to financial sector depth in
nearby countries, and it is logical that
they should do so, since international
finance facilitates domestic finance.
Do countries benefit from greater
financial sector development? The
evidence is that economies with more
competitive financial sectors have
higher per capita income levels and
display faster rates of GDP growth
than do other economies, which is
not surprising, given the importance
of financial arrangements to modern
economies. Another way to express
this question is to ask what the
alternative is to competition in
financial markets. The alternative is
a monopolized or quasi-monopolized
sector that charges above-market
prices to consumers and businesses,
that rations capital on the basis of
personal relationships, and that serves
as a drag on local economies.
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Governance Issues
The central characteristics of
countries that become IFCs are
by now well understood: IFCs are
small countries, commonly below
one million in population, and are
generally more affluent than
other countries.
In addition, new evidence (Dharmapala
and Hines, 2009) shows that IFCs
score very well on the World Bank’s
cross-country measures of governance
quality, which include measures of
voice and accountability, political
stability, government effectiveness,
rule of law, and control of corruption.
These World Bank governance quality
measures are reported by Kaufmann,
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005), who
compile 352 different underlying
governance-related variables reported
in 37 different data sets collected by
international organizations, private
firms, nonprofits and universities.

IFCs score very
well on the
World Bank’s
cross-country
measures of
governance quality
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This evidence indicates that there are
almost no poorly governed IFCs. In
part, this reflects that IFCs have aboveaverage incomes, which tend not to
be associated with poor governance.
Furthermore, IFCs are very often small
countries, which may display different
political patterns than other countries.
But even after controlling for these
factors there is a pronounced pattern in

which IFCs score highly on World Bank
governance measures.
Figure two illustrates this pattern.
The figure depicts data for countries
with populations below one million
in 1982; the squares represent IFCs,
the dots small countries that are not
IFCs. The horizontal axis measures the
natural logarithm of per capita GDP,
whereas the vertical axis measures
a country’s score on the World Bank
governance index. The straight line in
the diagram represents the predicted
(positive) association between income
and governance levels from a simple
statistical analysis.
It is clear from this figure that IFCs
have higher governance scores than
their sizes and affluence levels would
otherwise warrant. 17 of the IFCs
depicted in Figure two lie above the
predicted line, whereas only four lie
below it. In a statistical analysis that
includes a larger sample of countries,
and controls for other observable
variables including income, population,
and aspects of geography, the impact
of good governance on the likelihood
of becoming an IFC is both statistically
significant and quantitatively very large:
improving the quality of governance
from the level of Brazil to that of
Portugal raises the likelihood of a small
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country being an IFC from 26 percent to
roughly 61 percent.
Cross-country evidence of this type can
be difficult to interpret, since the data
reflect a non-random assignment of
local governance quality, which may
be correlated with other economic
and political conditions that influence
whether or not a country becomes an
IFC. The association of governance
quality and IFC status persists
in statistical work that includes
controls for additional considerations
such as measures of economic
openness, British legal origins, use
of the English language, use of a
parliamentary system, communications
infrastructure, and natural resource
abundance. In addition, measures of
past governance quality are associated
with being an IFC in 2004, suggesting
that the relevant components of
governance institutions are those that
are stable over long periods of time.

It is clear that
having high
quality governance
institutions and
effective public
servants is closely
connected to
effective operation
as an IFC
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Why are better-governed countries
more likely than others to be IFCs?
One important interpretation is that
the returns to becoming an IFC are
greater for well-governed countries:
that higher foreign investment flows,
and the economic benefits that
accompany them, are more likely
to materialize for well-governed
IFCs than they would for poorlygoverned countries that attempt to set
themselves up as financial centers. In
this interpretation, poorly governed
countries do not forego potential
economic benefits in not becoming
IFCs, since few if any of benefits would
flow to them if they did. Evidence

from the behavior of American firms
is consistent with this explanation,
in that, among poorly governed
countries, low tax rates do not prompt
very much additional U.S. investment,
whereas among well governed
countries there is a significant
investment impact of lower tax rates
(Dharmapala and Hines, 2009).
This is not the only interpretation of
the evidence; it is also possible that
the financial activity of IFC economies,
and resulting affluence, improves local
governance by encouraging media
outlets, keeping citizens informed,
and rewarding high-quality public
service with the returns that can be
earned in a market economy upon
leaving government. Either way,
it is clear that having high quality
governance institutions and effective
public servants is closely connected
to effective operation as an IFC.
The world benefits from additional
reminders that quality governance is
important to many aspects of peoples’
lives, not the least of which is their
livelihoods, and IFCs, which as a group
are both well-governed and affluent,
offer such reminders.
The evidence that IFCs tend to be well
governed may seem inconsistent with
the reputation of IFCs as locations
in which investors can readily hide
assets in order to launder funds,
evade taxes, or avoid other financial
commitments. Slemrod (2008) offers a
statistical analysis of the determinants
of IFC status and the determinants of
whether or not countries are identified
as money laundering sites by the
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intergovernmental Financial Action
Task Force on Money Laundering,
which operates out of the OECD
headquarters in Paris. Slemrod
confirms that, controlling for other
country characteristics, bettergoverned countries are more likely than
others to be IFCs, but reports that the
same is not true of money laundering
sites; instead, he finds that countries
with better governance are a bit less
likely than others to be listed as money
laundering sites. This reflects in part
that many countries listed as money
laundering sites are not IFCs, and most
IFCs are not listed as money laundering
sites; but also more broadly, that these
two groups of countries have very
dissimilar characteristics.

Most IFCs are not
listed as money
laundering sites
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The secret nature of money laundering,
tax evasion, and the use of anonymous
corporations and bank accounts
makes it very difficult to know just
how prevalent such practices are and
where they are undertaken. Much of
the limited available evidence concerns
locations where practices are detected,
but these need not be representative of
where they occur – and since detection
typically happens long after occurrence,
evidence of detected money laundering
and tax evasion typically identifies only
where practices took place in the past.
Consequently, there is a conjectural
element to most classifications of
money laundering sites, in which
context it is interesting to note that the
money laundering list produced by the
OECD-connected intergovernmental
Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering has no OECD member
countries on the list.

A very recent study by Sharman
(forthcoming) offers powerful
evidence of the selective enforcement
of national policies that generally
prohibit the establishment of
anonymous corporations and bank
accounts that can be used for all
sorts of purposes, including money
laundering and tax evasion. Sharman
approached corporate service
providers in 22 different countries
about the possibility of creating shell
corporations, for which, in those cases
in which anonymous companies were
successfully established, he also
attempted to create anonymous bank
accounts. The virtue of this study is
that the same approaches were used in
each case, and the resulting evidence
does not depend on ultimate detection,
since Sharman has full knowledge of
when he was and was not successful.
The evidence is that more than a third
of the time Sharman was able to set up
anonymous corporations quite readily
and at very low cost, though creating
accompanying anonymous bank
accounts proved more difficult, though
far from impossible.
The national pattern of Sharman’s
evidence is most instructive. Sharman
was unable to establish anonymous
corporations using corporate service
providers located in commonlyidentified IFCs, including: the Bahamas,
the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman
Islands, Dominica, Nauru, Panama,
and the Seychelles. By contrast,
corporate service providers in OECD
countries, including the United States,
the United Kingdom, Spain and Canada,
proved most helpful to his enterprise.
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IFCs more
effective at
enforcement and
thereby much
less attractive
locations for
money laundering
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He readily established anonymous
corporations using these providers,
with those in the United States
distinguished by the ease with which
they accommodated his request to
create the corporations and set up bank
accounts with unverifiable personal
information. Such corporations and
accounts offer excellent opportunities
for those interested in using them for
those purposes for which anonymity is
particularly desirable.

evaders and others eager to maintain
their anonymity would find these
bonds to be attractive investments, yet
Klautke and Weichenrieder report that
the introduction of the Savings Directive
was not accompanied by significant
appreciation of the prices of these
bonds relative to more transparent
alternatives, suggesting that European
investors have access to even better
methods of hiding their money when
they need to do so.

Sharman’s evidence is consistent
with the findings of Klaute and
Weichenrieder (2008) concerning
the impact of the European Savings
Directive, a policy in which European
Union members are generally required
to report interest income earned by
nonresidents to their countries of
residence. The Savings Directive is
intended to prevent tax avoidance
through the use of foreign savings
accounts located elsewhere in Europe,
and thereby facilitate the imposition of
home-country taxes on interest income.
Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg
were granted temporary exemptions
from this reporting regime, however, in
return for imposing withholding taxes
on interest earned by nonresidents (the
proceeds of which are paid by Austria,
Belgium and Luxembourg to residence
countries without disclosing the
identities of account-holders). The plot
thickens when one learns that certain
older bonds were “grandfathered”
when the Savings Directive was
introduced, the consequence being
that owners of these bonds are subject
neither to reporting nor to withholding
taxes on their interest receipts. Tax

The adherence of IFC corporate service
providers to established norms of
documentation and transparency in
the creation of corporations and bank
accounts may have many sources,
including the efforts of the OECD
(recounted in Sharman, 2006) and
various national governments to
require compliance by IFCs. This,
together with national aspirations and
ability to wield effective government
power with transparent democratic
governance, may conspire to make
IFCs more effective at enforcement
and thereby much less attractive
locations for money laundering and
tax evasion than many of their larger
brethren. Financial transparency has
many attractive features, including
that it indirectly reduces opportunities
for domestic and foreign corruption by
making it difficult to hide the proceeds
of bribery. Consequently, it may not
be surprising that good governance
and financial scrupulousness are
associated among IFCs.
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Tax Policy
Efficiency
It stands to reason that countries
eager to attract foreign investment
might compete with each other
by reducing tax rates, as a result
of which taxes, and therefore
government expenditures, are driven
to inefficiently low levels.
To the extent that IFCs contribute to
this tax competition, either by offering
investors low tax rates themselves,
or by facilitating investment in other
low-tax countries, then IFCs might
be responsible for some of the
problems associated with excessive
tax competition. The likelihood of
such an outcome depends on the tax
policies available to governments
and the nature of the competitive
environment. In order to evaluate this
prospect it is helpful to consider the
incentives that countries face.
It is noteworthy that international
tax competition may also produce
outcomes in which capital taxes
are higher than they would be in
the absence of competition. This
can happen when there is foreign
ownership of productive factors, when
competing countries differ greatly in
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size, or when multiple governments
attempt to tax the same income
sources (Hines, 2006).
The case of foreign ownership is
clear: governments that care only
about the welfare of domestic
residents have incentives to adopt
policies that enrich residents at
the expense of foreigners. Foreign
ownership of local firms may
encourage governments to raise
local capital tax rates above the
levels they would impose in the
absence of economic openness,
since much of the tax burden is
borne by owners to whom the taxing
government is largely indifferent.
Even foreign ownership of local
land may trigger higher corporate
tax rates, if the burden of corporate
taxes is in part borne by landowners
in the form of lower prices. Finally,
governments may have incentives
to overtax the foreign earnings of
domestic companies, since doing so
discourages foreign investment and
thereby directs resources to the home
economy, a valuable exchange in the
presence of tax or other distortions.
If all governments respond to these
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incentives then the result is that
capital will be overtaxed by everyone.
The integration of world economies
can contribute to the incentive that
countries face to tax business income
too heavily. Integrated business
production may entail many stages
in several different countries, all of
which contribute to final output. In
such a setting, taxes on one stage
of production impose burdens on
all the others by reducing the aftertax returns earned from producing
final output. Taxpayers can avoid
these taxes, but at a cost; and one
method of avoidance is simply to
scale back on production everywhere.
As noted by Keen (1998), Keen and
Kotsogiannis (2003), and others,
the vertical nature of production in
several countries gives incentives to
impose taxes for which significant
parts of the burdens are borne by
other taxing jurisdictions – which
leads to overtaxation.
IFCs figure prominently in current
debates over the scope and
consequences of tax competition.
IFCs are widely believed to accelerate
the process of tax competition
between governments. A separate,
and more likely, possibility,
however, is that the tax avoidance
opportunities presented by IFCs allow
other countries to maintain high
capital tax rates without suffering
dramatic reductions in foreign direct
investment. Hence the widespread
use of IFCs may retard what would
otherwise be aggressive competition
between other countries to reduce
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taxes in order to attract and maintain
investment. It is not even necessary
that high-tax countries are aware of
the importance of IFCs in preserving
their ability to attract foreign
investment. In effect, what IFCs do
is permit governments to distinguish
investments, subjecting relatively

IFCs allow
other countries
to maintain
high capital tax
rates without
suffering dramatic
reductions in
foreign direct
investment
immobile domestic investment to
higher tax rates than the highly
mobile international investment.
Keen (2001) and Hong and Smart
(2007) identify the wide set of
conditions in which countries benefit
from differentiating tax systems in
this way, and its impact in improving
the outcomes of tax competition.
The evidence is that, despite
whatever incentives there may be
to compete over tax rates, the tax
burden on corporate income in OECD
countries has fallen little, if at all,
over the past 25 years (see Griffith
and Klemm, 2004, and Hines, 2006).
Corporate tax rates have fallen, but
these declines have been at least
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matched by expansions in corporate
tax bases. Corporate tax collections
are the product of tax rates and tax
bases; governments choose tax
rates, and governments also choose
definitions of tax bases. The rules
determining depreciation allowances,
inventory valuation, the taxation
of capital gains, the deductibility
of interest payments, pension and
option compensation, and a host of
other considerations all affect the
tax burden on corporations just as
strongly as do statutory corporate
tax rates. Over the same period that
statutory corporate tax rates have
fallen, governments have broadened
tax bases, so that the ratio of national
corporate tax revenues to GDP among
OECD countries has not declined
since 1990. The ratio of corporate
tax revenues to total tax collections
offers a separate measure of the
extent to which governments rely on
corporate taxes, and here too it is
clear that corporate tax revenue as
a share of total taxes among OECD
countries has not fallen over time,
and in fact, reached new highs in
2003 and 2004. The use of IFCs by
foreign investors helps to explain this
evidence, as high-tax countries are
able to maintain high tax rates on
domestic investment while continuing
to draw significant levels of foreign
investment (Hines, 2006).
The analysis of tax competition
addresses in large part the concerns
that the use of financing structures in
IFCs may erode tax bases in high-tax
countries. The point of the analysis is
that it is important to think about the
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alternatives, since it is a mistake to
contemplate a world in which all tax
provisions are unchanged but IFCs
are somehow no longer available to
taxpayers. If IFCs were unavailable,
then tax competition elsewhere in the
world would take on a very different
character, most likely resulting in
an outcome in which tax rates on
business income were significantly
reduced relative to what they are today.

The ratio of
national corporate
tax revenues to
GDP among
OECD countries
has not declined
since 1990
There is a largely separate channel
through which IFCs contribute to
tax collections elsewhere, which
is by taxing business and personal
income at very low rates and thereby
permitting other countries to tax the
remainder at high rates. This channel
is most clear in the case of countries
such as the United States, which
subject foreign income to taxation
with provision of foreign tax credits,
and for which low rates of foreign
tax entail few foreign tax credits and
therefore greater domestic taxation.
Hines and Rice (1994) analyze the
U.S. tax revenue consequences of
IFC policies, concluding that the low
corporate tax rates available in IFCs
would enhance U.S. corporate tax
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collections even if the low tax rates
diverted investment from the United
States to foreign locations. Dyreng
and Lindsey (2009) offer confirmatory
evidence in their study of accounting
income reported by publicly-traded
U.S. corporations, where they find
that U.S. firms with foreign affiliates
in certain IFCs pay lower foreign
taxes and higher U.S. taxes than
do otherwise-similar large U.S.
companies. Finally, as noted by Hines
(1996), corporate taxes represent
only the first level at which business
income is taxed; governments also
tax business income when firms pay
dividends to individual shareholders,
when owners of firms deploy their
profits to make personal expenditures
that are subject to excise and valueadded taxation, and at other stages
of income transfer, such as when
income is bequeathed. By taxing
business income so lightly, IFCs
indirectly enhance the revenue
potential of all of these other taxes.

Corporate tax
systems are
raising revenue
now at roughly
the same clip that
they have for the
past 30 years
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In evaluating the evidence, it
is important to recognize the
significance of something that has
not happened: corporate and other
business taxes have not disappeared.
On the contrary, corporate tax
systems are raising revenue now
at roughly the same clip that they
have for the past 30 years. If the
reality were different, if corporate
tax collections had instead fallen
rapidly over the past 30 years, then
it would be natural to point to such
a development as confirmation
of the impact of tax competition,
fueled in part by the presence of

IFCs, and to forecast continued
declines in corporate tax revenue.
The persistence of corporate tax
collections does not imply that there
is no tax competition, but instead
that, in the modern financial world,
competition takes a form that does
not entail reduced corporate taxation.
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Economic Growth
in IFCs
While individual country experiences
differ, IFCs as a group have enjoyed
very rapid economic growth in the past
two decades.

Financial
and other
contributions of
IFC economies
add value to the
world in the
same way that
industries in
other countries do
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Evidence reported by Hines (2005)
indicates that the real per capita
incomes of IFCs grew by 3.3 percent
a year since 1982, whereas the
comparable figure for the world as a
whole is 1.4 percent. As a result, by
1999 the largest IFCs held 0.8 percent
of world population (not counting
the United States), whereas their
economies contributed 2.3 percent of
total world product (again excluding
that of the United States), so per capita
economic product in IFCs is more than
double the world average.
Does the affluence of IFCs come at the
expense of the rest of the world? There
is no reason to think it does. Indeed,
standard economic theory suggests
the opposite: greater income earned
by one part of the economy redounds
ultimately to the benefit of all other
parts of the economy (Bhagwati,
Panagariya and Srinivasan, 2004).
Financial and other contributions of
IFC economies add value to the world
in the same way that industries in

other countries do, and individuals and
businesses who earn returns in IFCs
ultimately spend and distribute their
returns in ways that stimulate demand
for output everywhere. Consequently,
the high rates of IFC economic
growth have the effect of buoying the
world economy, just as slow growth
elsewhere tends to depress rates of
economic activity in IFC economies.
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Conclusion: IFCs
as Pressure Valves
There is understandable interest in
the impact of international financial
centers on other countries, and
fortunately, there is extensive recent
research that offers important insights
into these questions.

The evidence
indicates that
IFCs contribute
to financial
development
and stability
in neighboring
countries
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The evidence indicates that IFCs
contribute to financial development
and stability in neighboring countries,
encourage investment, employment,
and other aspects of business
development in high-tax countries, have
salutary effects on tax competition,
promote good government, and
enhance economic growth elsewhere.
This evidence appears to be quite
robust, and suggests a rather different
interpretation of the IFC experience
than some that appear from more
casual readings of the history.
The quantitative economic evidence of
the impact of IFCs on other countries
offers a useful reminder of two valuable
propositions. The first is the benefit
of diversity. Simply the fact that IFC
policies differ from those of their hightax neighbors does not imply that there
is something wrong or undesirable
about what it is that IFCs do. On the
contrary, it is the difference between

what IFCs do and what other countries
do that makes IFCs valuable to other
countries. All human institutions
are fallible, including those that
produce economic policies in high-tax
countries. IFCs play the important
role of pressure valves, assisting the
policies of their high-tax neighbors by
letting off economic steam when the
pressure of constrained or excessive
policies elsewhere becomes too great.
The second proposition is that there
are no economic limits. Greater
innovation, production and prosperity
in one part of the world need not
come at the expense of the rest of
the world; instead the opposite is
the case, since there is always and
everywhere scope for economic
expansion with enlightened policies.
It is simply misguided to proceed
on the assumption that total world
economic growth is limited, even in an
era when environmental concerns and
population pressures create their own
challenges. As a consequence, the
economic successes of international
financial centers do not threaten the
prosperity of other parts of the world,
appearing instead, on the basis of
considerable evidence, to enhance it.
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Figure 1: Domestic and Foreign Sales Growth Rates of U.S. Multinational Firms
Figure 1: Domestic
and Foreign Sales Growth Rates of U.S.
Multinational Firms, 1982-1989, 1989-1994, and 1994-1999
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